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  1. Apr 24, 2024
  3. Sep 01, 2022
  5. Dec 03, 2021
  7. Apr 19, 2021
    • Jeffrey Mitchell's avatar
      ecryptfs: fix kernel panic with null dev_name · 90466255
      Jeffrey Mitchell authored 
      When mounting eCryptfs, a null "dev_name" argument to ecryptfs_mount()
causes a kernel panic if the parsed options are valid. The easiest way to
reproduce this is to call mount() from userspace with an existing
eCryptfs mount's options and a "source" argument of 0.

Error out if "dev_name" is null in ecryptfs_mount()

Fixes: 237fead6

 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarJeffrey Mitchell <jeffrey.mitchell@starlab.io>
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
      90466255
    • Lee Jones's avatar
      ecryptfs: main: Demote a bunch of non-conformant kernel-doc headers · e2401206
      Lee Jones authored 
      
Fixes the following W=1 kernel build warning(s):

 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:28: warning: Incorrect use of kernel-doc format:  * Module parameter that defines the ecryptfs_verbosity level.
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:30: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'int ecryptfs_verbosity = 0; '
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:40: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_message_buf_len = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_MSG_CTX_ELEMS; '
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:52: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'signed long ecryptfs_message_wait_timeout = ECRYPTFS_MAX_MSG_CTX_TTL / HZ; '
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:65: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'unsigned int ecryptfs_number_of_users = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_NUM_USERS; '
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'dentry' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file'
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Function parameter or member 'lower_file' not described in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file'
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:106: warning: Excess function parameter 'ecryptfs_dentry' description in 'ecryptfs_init_lower_file'
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Function parameter or member 'sbi' not described in 'ecryptfs_parse_options'
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:244: warning: Excess function parameter 'sb' description in 'ecryptfs_parse_options'
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'fs_type' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount'
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in 'ecryptfs_mount'
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:478: warning: expecting prototype for ecryptfs_get_sb(). Prototype was for ecryptfs_mount() instead
 fs/ecryptfs/main.c:645: warning: Function parameter or member 'vptr' not described in 'inode_info_init_once'

Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: "Michael A. Halcrow" <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "Michael C. Thompson" <mcthomps@us.ibm.com>
Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarLee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
[tyhicks: Correct the function documentation for ecryptfs_mount()]
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
      e2401206
  9. Jan 24, 2021
  11. Feb 14, 2020
  13. May 30, 2019
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 156 · 1a59d1b8
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version this program is distributed in the
  hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
  the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
  purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
  should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
  with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc
  59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s).

Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <a...
      1a59d1b8
  15. Nov 27, 2017
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz) · 1751e8a6
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel
superblock flags.

The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the
moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to.

Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call,
while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags.

The script to do this was:

    # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be
    # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but
    # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags.
    FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \
            include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \
            security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h"
    # the list of MS_... constants
    SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \
          DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \
          POSIXACL UNBIND...
      1751e8a6
  17. Nov 15, 2017
  19. Nov 08, 2017
  21. Nov 04, 2017
  23. Jul 17, 2017
    • David Howells's avatar
      VFS: Convert sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY to sb_rdonly(sb) · bc98a42c
      David Howells authored 
      Firstly by applying the following with coccinelle's spatch:

	@@ expression SB; @@
	-SB->s_flags & MS_RDONLY
	+sb_rdonly(SB)

to effect the conversion to sb_rdonly(sb), then by applying:

	@@ expression A, SB; @@
	(
	-(!sb_rdonly(SB)) && A
	+!sb_rdonly(SB) && A
	|
	-A != (sb_rdonly(SB))
	+A != sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-A == (sb_rdonly(SB))
	+A == sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-!(sb_rdonly(SB))
	+!sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-A && (sb_rdonly(SB))
	+A && sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-A || (sb_rdonly(SB))
	+A || sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) != A
	+sb_rdonly(SB) != A
	|
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) == A
	+sb_rdonly(SB) == A
	|
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) && A
	+sb_rdonly(SB) && A
	|
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) || A
	+sb_rdonly(SB) || A
	)

	@@ expression A, B, SB; @@
	(
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) ? 1 : 0
	+sb_rdonly(SB)
	|
	-(sb_rdonly(SB)) ? A : B
	+sb_rdonly(SB) ? A : B
	)

to remove left over excess bracketage and finally by applying:

	@@ expression A, SB; @@
	(
	-(A & MS_RDONLY) != sb_rdonly(SB)
	+(bool)(A & MS_RDONLY) != s...
      bc98a42c
  25. Apr 20, 2017
  27. Oct 06, 2016
  29. Jun 20, 2016
  31. Apr 04, 2016
    • Kirill A. Shutemov's avatar
      mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros · 09cbfeaf
      Kirill A. Shutemov authored 
      PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time
ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page
cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE.

This promise never materialized.  And unlikely will.

We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to
PAGE_SIZE.  And it's constant source of confusion on whether
PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case,
especially on the border between fs and mm.

Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much
breakage to be doable.

Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special.  They are
not.

The changes are pretty straight-forward:

 - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>;

 - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>;

 - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN};

 - page_cache_get() -> get_page();

 - page_cache_release() -> put_page();

This patc...
      09cbfeaf
  33. Jan 27, 2016
  35. Jan 14, 2016
    • Vladimir Davydov's avatar
      kmemcg: account certain kmem allocations to memcg · 5d097056
      Vladimir Davydov authored 
      
Mark those kmem allocations that are known to be easily triggered from
userspace as __GFP_ACCOUNT/SLAB_ACCOUNT, which makes them accounted to
memcg.  For the list, see below:

 - threadinfo
 - task_struct
 - task_delay_info
 - pid
 - cred
 - mm_struct
 - vm_area_struct and vm_region (nommu)
 - anon_vma and anon_vma_chain
 - signal_struct
 - sighand_struct
 - fs_struct
 - files_struct
 - fdtable and fdtable->full_fds_bits
 - dentry and external_name
 - inode for all filesystems. This is the most tedious part, because
   most filesystems overwrite the alloc_inode method.

The list is far from complete, so feel free to add more objects.
Nevertheless, it should be close to "account everything" approach and
keep most workloads within bounds.  Malevolent users will be able to
breach the limit, but this was possible even with the former "account
everything" approach (simply because it did not account everything in
fact).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: default avatarVladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: default avatarJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5d097056
  37. Apr 15, 2015
  39. Feb 24, 2015
    • Colin Ian King's avatar
      eCryptfs: ensure copy to crypt_stat->cipher does not overrun · 2a559a8b
      Colin Ian King authored 
      The patch 237fead6

: "[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and
fs/Kconfig" from Oct 4, 2006, leads to the following static checker
warning:

  fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:846 ecryptfs_new_file_context()
  error: off-by-one overflow 'crypt_stat->cipher' size 32.  rl = '0-32'

There is a mismatch between the size of ecryptfs_crypt_stat.cipher
and ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat.global_default_cipher_name causing the
copy of the cipher name to cause a off-by-one string copy error. This
fix ensures the space reserved for this string is the same size including
the trailing zero at the end throughout ecryptfs.

This fix avoids increasing the size of ecryptfs_crypt_stat.cipher
and also ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet_silly_stack.cipher_string and instead
reduces the of ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE to 31 and includes the + 1 for
the end of string terminator.

NOTE: An overflow is not possible in practice since the value copied
into global_default_cipher_name is validated by
ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string() at mount time. None of the allowed
cipher strings are long enough to cause the potential buffer overflow
fixed by this patch.

Signed-off-by: default avatarColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reported-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[tyhicks: Added the NOTE about the overflow not being triggerable]
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
      2a559a8b
  41. Jan 20, 2015
  43. Oct 23, 2014
    • Miklos Szeredi's avatar
      fs: limit filesystem stacking depth · 69c433ed
      Miklos Szeredi authored 
      
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems.  Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.

Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.

To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack.  Initially the limit is set to 2.

Signed-off-by: default avatarMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
      69c433ed
    • Tyler Hicks's avatar
      eCryptfs: Force RO mount when encrypted view is enabled · 332b122d
      Tyler Hicks authored 
      The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option greatly changes the
functionality of an eCryptfs mount. Instead of encrypting and decrypting
lower files, it provides a unified view of the encrypted files in the
lower filesystem. The presence of the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount
option is intended to force a read-only mount and modifying files is not
supported when the feature is in use. See the following commit for more
information:

  e77a56dd

 [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough

This patch forces the mount to be read-only when the
ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified by setting the
MS_RDONLY flag on the superblock. Additionally, this patch removes some
broken logic in ecryptfs_open() that attempted to prevent modifications
of files when the encrypted view feature was in use. The check in
ecryptfs_open() was not sufficient to prevent file modifications using
system calls that do not operate on a file descriptor.

Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: default avatarPriya Bansal <p.bansal@samsung.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.21+: e77a56dd [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough
      332b122d
  45. Oct 24, 2013
  47. Jul 10, 2013
  49. Mar 03, 2013
    • Eric W. Biederman's avatar
      fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules. · 7f78e035
      Eric W. Biederman authored 
      Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-"
and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules
to match.

A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code
that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many
users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel.

Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible
modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially
making things safer with no real cost.

Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which
filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf
with blacklist and alias directives.  Allowing simple, safe,
well understood work-arounds to known problematic software.

This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem
name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading
would not work.  While writing this patch I saw a handful o...
      7f78e035
  51. Oct 02, 2012
  53. Sep 21, 2012
  55. Sep 14, 2012
  57. Jul 22, 2012
  59. Jul 14, 2012
  61. Jul 13, 2012
  63. Jul 08, 2012
    • Tyler Hicks's avatar
      eCryptfs: Copy up POSIX ACL and read-only flags from lower mount · 069ddcda
      Tyler Hicks authored 
      When the eCryptfs mount options do not include '-o acl', but the lower
filesystem's mount options do include 'acl', the MS_POSIXACL flag is not
flipped on in the eCryptfs super block flags. This flag is what the VFS
checks in do_last() when deciding if the current umask should be applied
to a newly created inode's mode or not. When a default POSIX ACL mask is
set on a directory, the current umask is incorrectly applied to new
inodes created in the directory. This patch ignores the MS_POSIXACL flag
passed into ecryptfs_mount() and sets the flag on the eCryptfs super
block depending on the flag's presence on the lower super block.

Additionally, it is incorrect to allow a writeable eCryptfs mount on top
of a read-only lower mount. This missing check did not allow writes to
the read-only lower mount because permissions checks are still performed
on the lower filesystem's objects but it is best to simply not allow a
rw mount on top of ro mount. However, a ro eCryptfs mount on top of a rw
mount is valid and still allowed.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/1009207



Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: default avatarStefan Beller <stefanbeller@googlemail.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
      069ddcda
  65. Mar 20, 2012
  67. Aug 10, 2011
  69. May 29, 2011

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