tcp: reduce accepted window in NEW_SYN_RECV state

Jason commit made checks against ACK sequence less strict
and can be exploited by attackers to establish spoofed flows
with less probes.

Innocent users might use tcp_rmem[1] == 1,000,000,000,
or something more reasonable.

An attacker can use a regular TCP connection to learn the server
initial tp->rcv_wnd, and use it to optimize the attack.

If we make sure that only the announced window (smaller than 65535)
is used for ACK validation, we force an attacker to use
65537 packets to complete the 3WHS (assuming server ISN is unknown)

Fixes: 378979e9 ("tcp: remove 64 KByte limit for initial tp->rcv_wnd value")
Link: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/119/materials/slides-119-tcpm-ghost-acks-00


Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240523130528.60376-1-edumazet@google.com


Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>